DIGITAL INNOVATION
DIGITAL INNOVATION ‘DIGITAL EU’: THE GOOD, THE BAD & THE UGLY Dimensions of ‘Strategic Autonomy Europe’ and sources of power AUTHORITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY • Towards EU society • Trust circles (industry) Defining competences + social acceptance / demand EUROPEAN UNION • Normative power • Digital internal market EU 27 EU institutions provide operational framework EXTERNAL DIMENSION • Strategy and autonomy Partners and rivals Common Regulatory Framework Industrial Policies INDUSTRY • Interconnections • Cooperation Mutual dependencies Application and adaptations Bottom-up feedback Like a computer, it is time for the EU to seek updates — perhaps even rebooting its operating system — reassessing its strategic priorities, strengthening relations with like-minded partners, and reconsidering those with strategic rivals. Source: F. CAPPELLETTI, A. NESTORAS, G. POGOREL (2022), “Strategic Digital Autonomy”, European Liberal Forum, Brussels, ISBN 9782390670339; p. 10 (https://doi.org/10.53121/ELFTPS1 ) Microchips, together with new telecommunication technologies such as 5G and 6G, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and cybersecurity tools, as well as electronic and digital ID, are only a few of the key enablers within the different segments of this digital transition. Shortages in the supply chain and knowhow in these domains (as experienced during the pandemic) have underlined how diversification and even rethinking of strategic prerogatives must be at the centre of the EU’s political agendas. Therefore, finding the right partners to cooperate with is a significant part of a prosperous strategic Europe. Partners are defined as like-minded, market-oriented democracies towards which openness is essential. Transatlantic cooperation with both Americas, meaningful relations for trade and investment with democracies in Africa, as well as a close cooperation with Finding the right partners to cooperate with is a significant part of a prosperous strategic Europe. countries like Taiwan or Japan must be fostered. Trade and technology councils, and digital diplomacy sound good, but they miss meat on the bone. Additionally, as interests may vary over time and circumstances, it is crucial for the EU to explore new market-based relations under common standards, creating a systemic dialogue and reciprocal information-sharing mechanisms. To this end, a solid foundation of datagovernance and privacy rules is crucial. In fact, data can be defined as the ‘oil’ of a digital economy. With its recent effort in defining the Digital Services Act and the Digital Market Act, the Data Governance Act and Data Act, European institutions have taken significant steps toward the way European companies store, use, and process data and deal with privacy. The European data economy itself, however, is still far from reaching its full po- tential, undermining its strategic digital autonomy. Ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, the discussion on how data is processed for political advertising becomes increasingly important — to ensure transparency, protect citizens’ rights, while fighting disinformation and interference. The protection of citizens’ rights online is at the heart of the future digital Europe. With the rise of Chinese imperialism and following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, malicious activities in the digital domain have intensified. There is a need for the EU to be resilient in cyberspace. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities threaten the functioning of our economies, the internal market across the EU and represent a transversal danger to our societies. Being resilient in cyberspace requires strategic, proactive, integrated, and future-proof policy advancements. Resilience can neither be built by force nor can it be regulated into existence without a comprehensive strategy that listens to industry. This strategy must be future-proof and long-term, let the free market work, let the digital industry produce and avoid over-regulation. It may not be a miracle cure but it represents a liberal best practice to ensure policies that are truly ‘smart’. And the EU must facilitate such a strategy ‘yesterday’ if it wants to secure its ‘Fit4DigitalFuture’ plan - and bring digital strategic autonomy to reality. Like a computer, it is time for the EU to seek updates — perhaps even rebooting its operating system — reassessing its strategic priorities, strengthening relations with like-minded partners, and reconsidering those with strategic rivals. In times of smart-devices, achieving smart-policies is the only way to strengthen our digital future. About Dr. Antonios Nestoras Interim executive director at the European Liberal Forum (ELF) and Francesco Cappelletti, policy and research officer at the ELF. 21
